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1

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH,

:

Plaintiff/Appellee, :
v,

:

Case No. 930345-CA

JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS,

:

Priority No. 2

Defendant/Appellant.:
BRIEF OF APPELLEE
JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from a conditional plea of no contest to one
count of arranging

to distribute

a controlled

violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8 (1) (a) (ii)
count

of

possession

of

a

listed

chemical

substance, in
(1994), and one

with

intent

to

manufacture, in violation of Utah Code Ann. § 58-37d-4 (1994) , both
second degree felonies.

This Court has jurisdiction over the

appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2) (f) (Supp. 1994).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUES ON APPEAL AND
STANDARDS OF APPELLATE REVIEW
1.

Does the doctrine

of double

jeopardy bar a state

proceeding where the prior federal proceeding was dismissed before
trial?
2. Where a prior federal charge was dismissed on speedy trial
grounds, does the collateral estoppel doctrine mandate dismissal of
state charges on the same grounds?
Where the underlying facts are undisputed, as in these two
issues, the application of the law to the facts presents a legal

question which is reviewed for correctness. State v. Ramirez, 817
P.2d 774, 782 (Utah 1991).
3.

Did the trial court properly deny defendant's motion to

dismiss for failure of the State to produce a witness where
defendant

did not establish the materiality of the witness?

The determination of whether a witness is material presents a
legal question.

In reviewing that question, the appellate court

should grant the trial court a considerable measure of discretion
because of the fact-dependent nature of the determination.

State

v. Pena, 869 P.2d 932, 939-40 (Utah 1994).
4.

In the absence of a complete record of relevant evidence

on appeal, can this Court review the trial court's determination
that defendant was not entrapped?
Where an appellant fails to provide an adequate record on
appeal,

the

reviewing

proceedings below.

court

presumes

the

regularity

of the

Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P. 2d 1049,

1053 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, STATUTES AND RULES
All relevant provisions, statutes, and rules are included in
the text of this brief.
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
On August 7, 1991, as a result of a drug task force effort
involving the D.E.A. and Utah County law enforcement officers,
defendant was arrested and indicted in federal court on a single
count of attempting to manufacture more than one kilogram of
methamphetamine (R. 12, 19) . Based upon a violation of the federal
2

speedy trial act, the federal

indictment was dismissed with

prejudice prior to trial (R. 68) .1
Shortly thereafter, on August 27, 1992, defendant was arrested
and

charged

in state

court with one

count

of arranging to

distribute methamphetamine and two counts of possession of listed
chemicals with intent to manufacture, charges arising out of the
same activities that had engendered the federal charge.

(R. 1-2) .

Subsequently, defendant filed a variety of motions, both pro se and
through two different counsel.2
The trial court held a hearing on December 10, 1992, devoted
primarily to defendant's contention that he had been entrapped.3
The December hearing proceeded with the understanding that the
trial

court

would

take

the matter

under

advisement

pending

testimony at a later date from Ross Argyle, an out-of-state witness
whom the State agreed to try and locate with information provided
by the defense (Tr. 5-8, 10) .
On March 8, 1993, the trial court held a second hearing on the
entrapment issue. According to a minute entry, the State reported
that it could not locate the out-of-state witness
Addendum A) .
1

1992.

(R. 132 or

The State then called two other witnesses and

The charge was dismissed after a hearing on August 25,
The order was entered on September 3, 1992 (R. 68).

2

Defendant moved for a determination of entrapment, filed a
motion to dismiss on four different grounds, and moved both to
secure the attendance of an out-of-state witness and for payment of
witness fees and costs (R. 51-59, 89-98, 103-07, 109-114).
3

At the beginning of the December hearing, the parties
agreed to submit most of the other issues defendant had raised on
their respective memoranda (Tr. 3-4).
3

proffered the testimony of two more.

The trial court took all

matters under advisement (R. 132). On March 15, 1993, the court
issued a written ruling, denying both defendant's motion to dismiss
and his motion for determination of entrapment

(R. 147-61 or

Addendum B ) .
Following a plea bargain in which the State promised to drop
one count of possession of a listed chemical with intent to
manufacture, delete the prior conviction enhancement, and recommend
concurrent sentences, defendant entered a conditional plea of no
contest (R. 135-43).

This appeal followed.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS

Ross Argyle, the out-of-state witness in this case, met
defendant while they were both in custody in Oregon (Tr. 29) .
Sometime later, Argyle was extradited to Utah (Tr. 13). While in
the Utah County Jail, Argyle approached a Provo City police
officer, indicating "that he knew some people who were involved in
narcotics and would be willing to work with them in order to
possibly help himself out" (Tr. 26) .
mentioned

defendant's, stating

that

Among other names, Argyle
defendant

had previously

traveled to Utah to obtain precursor chemicals for the manufacture
of methamphetamine (Tr. 27).
Because defendant was residing out of state, the Provo police
officer

contacted

the federal D.E.A. for assistance

and was

referred to a drug task force member, Charles Illsley (Tr. 29) .
Illsley, whose expertise centered on clandestine drug labs and
their related activities, became the chief investigating officer in
4

the case (Tr. 51, 52-55).
2,

1991

at

the

Illsley met with Ross Argyle on August

Provo

City

police

department

(Tr.

75) .

Subsequently, Argyle placed two telephone calls to defendant in
Reno, Nevada to discuss arrangements for setting up a meth lab in
Utah County.4

See, e.g., Stip. Tr. of Telephone Conversation,

8/2/91 at 10:20 am, p. 2, 5; 8/2/91 at 8:30 pm, p. 5.
On August

3rd, Argyle, with Illsley present, telephoned

defendant again to discuss details of the operation.

Argyle

eventually turned the telephone over to Illsley, so that defendant
could talk directly to Argyle's "partner," who was purportedly
fronting the money for the drug lab (Tr. 58-59; Stip. Tr. of
Telephone Conversation, 8/3/91 at 8:55 pm, p. 2).

After the

evening of August 3rd, Illsley contacted defendant directly, and
defendant had no further contact with Ross Argyle (Tr. 22, 62) .
Argyle's work was complete.5
On August 5th and 6th, defendant talked with Charles Illsley
six times by telephone (See State's Exhibit #1) . In the course of
these conversations, defendant specified in considerable detail the
equipment and chemicals Illsley was to procure so that defendant
could manufacture methamphetamine

(Tr. 35-36, 63; Stip. Tr. of

4

All of the telephone conversations between defendant and
Ross Argyle, and defendant and Charles Illsley, between 10:20 am on
August 2, 1991, and through August 6, 1991, were recorded and
transcribed, and are part of the record on appeal. See State's
Exhibit #1.
5

On August 9th or 10th, after defendant had been arrested,
Illsley paid Ross Argyle $2000 from D.E.A. funds (Tr. 86, 89) .
Argyle apparently used the money to pay fines in Utah County. He
was subsequently released and left the jurisdiction (Tr. 31-32).
5

Telephone Conversations: 8/3/91 at 8:55 pm, p. 9-12; 8/6/91 at 2:53
pm, p. 3-13) .

After the two men had talked about procuring

precursor chemicals and drugs, Illsley let defendant know that he
was also interested in learning how to make methamphetamine (Tr.
77).

Defendant told Illsley it would cost him $10,000 in cash to

learn (Tr. 62-63, 77; Stip. Tr. of Telephone Conversation, 8/3/91
at 8:55 pm, p. 16-17).

Defendant also stated that he wanted part

of the proceeds from the sale of the drugs he would manufacture
(Stip. Tr. of Telephone Conversation, 8/3/91 at 8:55 pm, p. 17).
On August 7th, defendant took a bus from Reno to Wendover,
where Charles Illsley met him in a white Corvette and drove him to
a mobile home in Lindon, Utah.6

Once on the site, Illsley showed

defendant a stack of bills amounting to $10,000, the agreed-upon
"teaching fee" (Tr. 83) . Pursuant to defendant's instructions, all
the equipment he had specified was in the mobile home (Tr. 63) .
Defendant then made a list of miscellaneous items still needed for
the manufacture process (Tr. 69-70). When those had been procured,
defendant began the manufacture process by pouring bottles of
ephedrine pills into gallon jugs of distilled water (Tr. 72-73).
Illsley then told defendant he needed to talk with him outside. At
that juncture, a van drove up to the mobile home, Provo City's
S.W.A.T. team emerged, and defendant was arrested (Tr. 73).

6

The mobile home had been wired for video and sound by two
D.E.A. technicians (Tr. 64). The trial court viewed portions of
the videotape during the December 10th hearing (Tr. 65-70).
6

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The doctrine of double jeopardy does not apply to this case.
Because the federal charge against defendant was dismissed prior to
trial, jeopardy never attached in the federal action. Therefore,
there can be no double jeopardy resulting from the subsequent state
proceeding.
Neither can defendant prevail under the doctrine of collateral
estoppel, which "means simply that when an issue of ultimate fact
has once been determined by a valid and final judgment, that issue
cannot again be litigated between the parties in any future
lawsuit."

Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).

Defendant

fails to meet any of the requirements of this doctrine.

First,

defendant's underlying premise that the state and federal actions
in this case were the acts of a single sovereign, is entirely
unsupported. Defendant has mistakenly equated cooperation between
state and federal investigators with collusion between state and
federal prosecutors in charging defendant. Because the actions of
the

state

and

federal

governments

were

those

of

separate

sovereigns, the parties to the state and federal actions were not
the same.
Second, no issue of ultimate fact was determined by the prior
federal proceeding.

The only conclusive determination emerging

from the federal proceeding was that defendant had been denied his
statutory right to be tried within the prescribed time frame.
Finally, no substantive issues were litigated in the federal
proceeding. The federal proceeding ended with an order to dismiss
7

with prejudice.

Nothing was litigated.

Because defendant failed to prevail on any of the elements of
the collateral estoppel doctrine, his argument that the trial court
committed reversible error by failing to dismiss the state charges
after the federal court dismissed the federal charges fails.
Defendant's argument that the trial court erred by denying his
motion to dismiss for failure of the State to produce a material
witness must similarly fail.

A close reading of the first

entrapment hearing record reveals that both parties wanted to hear
from the witness, and that the State offered to try and locate the
witness with information that the defense agreed to provide.

The

trial transcript plainly reveals that the trial court did not
directly rule on defendant's motion to compel attendance, nor did
it make any finding concerning the materiality of the witness.
Later in the same hearing, when the matter of the missing witness
was discussed again, defendant speculated at length about the
potential content of his testimony.
At the second hearing, when the witness had not been located,
the

court

examined

the

overwhelming

record

evidence

against

defendant and properly determined that defendant had failed to
carry his burden of demonstrating the materiality of the missing
witness.
Finally, while defendant has raised the issue of entrapment,
he has failed to include in the record on appeal the transcript of
the second entrapment hearing. In the absence of a complete record
of relevant evidence on appeal, this court must presume the
8

regularity of the proceedings below, including the trial court's
determination that defendant was not entrapped.
ARGUMENT
POINT ONE
THE DOCTRINE OF DOUBLE JEOPARDY
UNDER
THE
UNITED
STATES
CONSTITUTION IS INAPPLICABLE IN
THIS CASE BECAUSE JEOPARDY NEVER
ATTACHED IN THE FEDERAL SYSTEM
It is axiomatic that a defendant is placed in jeopardy at the
time the jury is empaneled and sworn or, in the case of a bench
trial, when the first witness is sworn.
28, 37 (1978).

Crist v. Bretz, 437 U.S.

Because the federal charge against defendant was

dismissed prior to trial, no jeopardy attached in that action. Cf.
State v. Brickev, 714 P.2d 644, 646 (Utah 1986); State v. Harris,
517 P.2d 1313, 1314 (Utah 1974).

The pretrial disposition in

defendant's federal case cannot implicate double jeopardy because
"an accused must suffer jeopardy before he can suffer double
jeopardy."

Serfass v. United States. 420 U.S. 377, 393 (1975).

Defendant's federal charge was dismissed pursuant to a motion
made under 18 U.S.C. § 3162, the federal speedy trial act, which
gives the trial court discretion to grant the motion with or
without prejudice (R. 68) .

Defendant has mistakenly equated the

federal court's grant of his motion to dismiss with prejudice with
the attachment of jeopardy under the Fifth Amendment. The doctrine
of double jeopardy, however, is simply inapplicable to this case.

9

POINT TWO
BECAUSE THE COLLATERAL ESTOPPEL
DOCTRINE DOES NOT APPLY TO THIS
CASE, DISMISSAL OF THE FEDERAL
CHARGE ON SPEEDY TRIAL GROUNDS
DID NOT REQUIRE THE STATE COURT
TO DISMISS THE STATE CHARGES
Defendant relies on the collateral estoppel aspect of the
double jeopardy doctrine to argue that the trial court committed
reversible error by failing to dismiss the state charges after the
federal court dismissed the federal charges on the grounds that
defendant's right to a speedy trial had been violated.
Collateral estoppel

"means simply that when an issue of

ultimate fact has once been determined by a valid and final
judgment, that issue cannot again be litigated between the parties
in any future lawsuit." Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. 436, 443 (1970).
"Unlike the successive prosecutions prong of the double jeopardy
protection . . . this [collateral estoppel] aspect of the clause is
implicated by the pretrial disposition of a prior case if an
ultimate issue in the second prosecution was conclusively litigated
and necessarily determined as part of the judgment entered in the
first case."
Cir. 1990);

United States v. Blackwell, 900 F.2d 742, 745 (4th
see also United States v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666,

670 (W.D. Va. 1991) (citing Blackwell for this proposition).
In order for collateral estoppel to apply and, consequently,
for defendant to win his argument, defendant must prevail in three
determinations: first, that the parties involved in both actions
were

the

same; second, that an ultimate

issue of

fact was

determined in the prior federal proceeding; and third, that the
10

matter was conclusively litigated in the prior federal proceeding.
See Ashe v. Swenson, 397 U.S. at 443.
A. Because the actions of the state and federal governments
were plainly those of separate sovereigns, the parties to the
state and federal actions were not the same.
Defendant's essential contention is that the involvement of
state and local law enforcement officers in the investigation
preceding

the

prosecutions
sovereign.

federal

indictment

rendered

state

and

federal

in this case effectively the acts of a single
Because the state and federal prosecutors were acting

as one sovereign, claims defendant, the speedy trial date for the
state prosecution should be the same as that for the federal
prosecution. Thus, dismissal of the federal case should also bind
the State (Br. of App. at 9-10}.

Defendant also argues that the

alleged "delay" in filing the state charges violated his right to
due process (Br. of App. at 11).
This Court can only reach defendant's conclusion that the
federal proceeding should bar the subsequent state prosecution if
it first accepts defendant's underlying premise that the state and
federal actions involved in this case were, in actuality, the acts
of a single sovereign.

To do so, this Court must find that an

exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine governs this case.
Defendant's argument, however, is rooted in a fundamental
misunderstanding of both the dual sovereignty doctrine and the
limited exception that defendant wishes to apply to his case. The
dual sovereignty doctrine is a "well-established principle that a
federal prosecution does not bar a subsequent state prosecution of
11

the same person for the same acts." United States v. Wheeler. 435
U.S. 313, 316-17 (1978).

It is based on the principle that each

sovereign promulgates its own laws and has independent power to
prosecute offenses against it.
The dual sovereignty doctrine is founded on
the common law conception of crime as an
offense against the sovereignty of the
government. When a defendant in a single act
violates the "peace and dignity" of two
sovereigns by breaking the laws of each, he
has
committed
two
distinct
"offences"
[sic]. . . [W] hen the same act transgresses
the laws of two sovereigns, "it cannot be
truly averred that the offender has been twice
punished for the same offense; but only that
by one act he has committed two offenses, for
each of which he is justly punishable."
State v. Franklin, 735 P.2d 34, 36 (Utah 1987) (quoting Heath v.
Alabama. 106 S. Ct. 433, 437 (1985) (citation omitted)).
The policy underlying the dual sovereignty doctrine has been
explicitly

endorsed by the Utah Supreme Court under factual

circumstances similar to this case. In State v. Franklin, a state
prosecution also followed a federal proceeding.

There, the Court

observed that abandoning the dual sovereignty doctrine in favor of
defendant's preferred position that the federal proceeding would
bar the subsequent state proceeding "relinquishes unnecessarily the
power of the state to try and punish those who break its laws."
Franklin, 73 5 P.2d at 38. The Court elaborated:
Under the rule urged by defendant, the State
of Utah would be foreclosed from legitimate
prosecutions by the errors, omissions, or
inadequacies of federal prosecutions and would
be unable to try even a defendant who had
received a federal pardon or whose conviction
was reversed by a federal appellate court
because
of
an
error
in
the
federal
12

trial . . . . We note also that the approach
urged by defendant, under which the federal
prosecution would be treated as if it were a
Utah proceeding, would allow the federal
government to destroy Utah's right to try
defendant merely by bringing defendant to
trial for some lesser included offense . . . .
Were we to hold that Utah could not try
individuals because they had been previously
tried in a federal court, we still could not
prevent the federal government from trying
individuals after they had been tried by Utah;
we
would
thus
be
surrendering
state
sovereignty in exchange for a more theoretical
than real gain in individual rights.
Id. This endorsement of the policy underlying the dual sovereignty
doctrine effectively closes the door on defendant's due process
argument that the federal violation of the speedy trial act, which
resulted in defendant's incarceration for a year prior to dismissal
of the federal charge, should be charged against the State.

The

State cannot be held responsible for errors committed by the
federal sovereign.

The trial court so held, and defendant has

offered no persuasive argument or authority to the contrary.

See

Trial Court Ruling at 8 or Addendum B.
Defendant would like his case to fall within a "narrow
exception to the 'dual sovereignty' doctrine, where one prosecuting
sovereign can be said to be acting as a 'tool' of the other, or
where the second prosecution amounts to a 'sham and a cover' for
the first." United States v. Aboumoussallem. 726 F.2d 906, 910 (2d
Cir. 1984)

(citing Barktus v. Illinois, 359 U.S. 121 (1959))

(citation omitted).

When a second prosecution is merely a 'sham'

for continuing the prosecution initiated by the first sovereign,
the philosophical basis for the dual sovereignty doctrine is
13

undermined and double jeopardy concerns are clearly implicated.
For his argument, defendant relies primarily on United States
v. Belcher, 762 F. Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1991) .

In that case,

successive prosecutions charging identical crimes were brought
first in state court and then in federal court by a single
prosecutor

with

jurisdictions.

coincident

authority

to

prosecute

in

both

Calling this situation "extremely unusual," the

Belcher court found that "[t]he fact that the two sovereigns have
essentially pooled their powers in one prosecutor strongly suggests
. . . that in reality there are no longer two sovereigns at work."
Id. at 671, 673.
Defendant's argument fails because the facts of this case
clearly demonstrate that the state and federal prosecutions were
separate entities.

Furthermore, there was no record evidence

supporting defendant's conclusion that the state and federal
prosecutors were acting in concert in filing charges under federal
and state law.

Defendant has mistakenly equated cooperation

between state and federal law enforcement
collusion between
defendant.7

state

and

investigators with

federal prosecutors

in

charging

(See Br. of App. at 9) .

7

Defendant cites to State v. Shabata, which makes passing
reference to the fact that " [information known to police officers
working on a case is charged to the prosecution since the officers
are part of the prosecution team." State v. Shabata, 678 P.2d 785,
788 (Utah 1984). That case addressed whether the prosecutor's
withholding of certain evidence denied defendant a fair trial. It
has no particular relevance to this case, dealing with state and
federal law enforcement personnel working in concert in a case in
which separate federal and state charges are eventually filed.
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Several

courts

have

noted

that

joint

federal-state

investigative efforts do not create a "sham" prosecution.

United

States v. Bernhardt, 831 F.2d 181, 182 (9th Cir. 1987) ("It is
clear that the Bartkus exception does not bar cooperation between
prosecuting sovereignties."); Aboumoussallem, 726 F.2d at 910 ("At
most, there was here no more than a joint investigation of criminal
activity,

which

we

have

held

does

not

preclude

separate

prosecutions."); Belcher, 762 F. Supp. at 671 n.3 ("The court does
not mean to suggest that cooperation between State and federal law
enforcement officials is not expected and hoped for . . . . " ) .
Neither does the fact that the federal proceeding ended before
the state charges were filed create a sham.
726 F.2d at 910 n.3.

See Aboumoussallem,

The prudence of state prosecutors deferring

until federal prosecutions are concluded is well-documented. See,
e.g. , People v. Gates, 743 P.2d 301, 315-17 (Cal. 1987), cert,
denied, 486 U.S. 1027 (1988); People v. Bradford, 549 P.2d 1225,
1234 (Cal. 1976).
Defendant has produced no evidence to demonstrate that the
state and federal prosecutors were acting in concert and no
persuasive legal authority to support his conclusion that the
"sham" exception to the dual sovereignty doctrine should apply.
Because defendant has failed to meet the first requirement of the
dual sovereignty doctrine--that the parties to both actions were
the same--his collateral estoppel argument fails.
B.
An issue of ultimate fact was not determined in the
federal proceeding.
Defendant's collateral estoppel argument also fails to meet
15

the second requirement of that doctrine.

The federal proceeding

terminated with an order of dismissal with prejudice because
defendant's statutory right to a speedy trial within the federal
system had been violated8
determination

emerging

(R. 68) .

from

the

Thus, the only conclusive

federal proceeding

was that

defendant had been denied his statutory right to be tried within
the prescribed time period. Because the substantive merits of the
federal drug charge were never reached, no issues of ultimate fact
were conclusively determined by a final judgment.

See Ashe v.

Swenson, 379 U.S. at 443.
C.
No substantive issues were litigated in the federal
proceeding.
Finally, the federal proceeding ended with an order to dismiss
with prejudice.

Nothing was litigated in the first proceeding.

Nothing was decided as to the merits of defendant's case.
Because defendant failed to prevail on any--let alone all
three--of the requirements of the collateral estoppel doctrine,
his claim that the trial court committed reversible error by
failing to dismiss the state charges after the federal court
dismissed the federal charges must fail.

The collateral estoppel

doctrine does not apply to this case.

8

In contrast, defendant did not assert that his Sixth
Amendment right to a speedy trial had been violated. See United
States v. Grismore, 564 F.2d 929, 932 (10 Cir. 1977).
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POINT THREE
THE TRIAL COURT PROPERLY DENIED
DEFENDANT'S MOTION TO DISMISS
FOR FAILURE OF THE STATE TO
PRODUCE A MATERIAL WITNESS
Defendant asserts that he was denied his constitutional right
to compulsory process by the State's inability to locate Ross
Argyle, an out-of-state witness in whom both the defense and the
State were interested. For this proposition, defendant seems to be
relying on the court's acceptance of the State's offer to try and
locate Argyle with information provided by the defense.

He

interprets this acceptance as an affirmative ruling on defendant's
motion to compel attendance of the out-of-state witness and, by
implication, as a finding that Argyle was a "material witness,"
within the meaning of Utah Code Ann. § 77-21-3 (1995) . Defendant,
however, has misconstrued both the law and the facts.
The Sixth Amendment to the U.S. Constitution guarantees that
"[i]n all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right
. . . to have compulsory process for obtaining witnesses in his
favor. . . . "

The United States Supreme Court has determined that

where a defendant had been deprived arbitrarily of "testimony
[that] would have been relevant and material, and . . . vital to
the defense," he was denied his right to compulsory process.
Washington v. Texas, 388 U.S. 14, 16 (1967). In order to establish
a violation of his constitutional right to compulsory process, a
defendant has the burden of showing that the testimony of the
absent witness "would have been both material and favorable to his
17

defense."

State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d 264, 274

(Utah 1985)

(quoting United States v. Valenzuela-Bernal. 458 U.S. 858, 873
(1982) .
The test for materiality has been articulated by the Utah
Supreme

Court: "Testimony is material, and its exclusion is

therefore prejudicial, if there is a reasonable probability that
its presence would affect the outcome of the trial.

'A reasonable

probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.'"

Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 274 (quoting Strickland v.

Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 694 (1984).

In applying this test, the

overriding concern is for the justness of the result:
This means that the omission must be evaluated
in the context of the entire record. If there
is no reasonable doubt about guilt whether or
not the evidence is considered, there is no
justification for a new trial. On the other
hand,
if
the
verdict
is
already
of
questionable validity, additional evidence of
relatively
minor
importance
might
be
sufficient to create a reasonable doubt.
State v. Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 275 (quoting United States v.
Valenzuela-Bernal, 458 U.S. at 868).
In this case, contrary to defendant's assertion, the trial
court did not determine prior to the first entrapment hearing that
Ross Argyle was a material witness.

At the beginning of that

hearing, the trial court considered defendant's motion to secure
the attendance of out-of-state witness. (See R. 109-12).

When it

became clear that both the prosecution and the defense wanted to
hear

from

Ross Argyle, the

court

determined

that

the most

expeditious procedure would be for the State to locate and subpoena
18

Argyle with information provided by the defense (Tr. 5-9).9

The

trial transcript plainly reveals, however, that the trial court did
not directly rule on defendant's motion to compel attendance nor
did it make any finding concerning Argyle's materiality.10
Subsequently, after all of the witnesses at the December 10th
entrapment hearing had been heard, the court pursued the issue of
Argyle's testimony with defendant:
What is your intent with [Ross Argyle] ? If you
could proffer as it relates to your position
today, what would you state? That doesn't bar
you or stop you from calling him and
presenting additional information. But what
critical factors or what substance are
involved that would have bearing upon the
Court's determination . . . on this motion?
(Tr. 92-93).

In essence, after having heard substantial evidence

that weighed heavily against defendant, the court asked defendant
to make a "plausible showing" that the addition of testimony from
Ross Argyle
evidentiary

would

create

balance would

a reasonable
tip

in his

probability
favor.

that

the

See State v.

Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 274-75.
9

To that end, the court asked defendant to prepare an order
consistent with the agreement of the parties and the court (Tr. 9) .
Although such an order does not appear in the record on appeal, the
substance of the agreement is reflected in the minute entry of
December 10, 1992 (R. 126) .
10

Defendant claims that because the State did not seek
clarification of the materiality issue, the assumption should be
that Argyle was a material witness (See Br. of App. at 15). The
burden was on defendant, however, to make such a showing.
Schreuder, 712 P.2d at 274-75. Furthermore, if the trial court
failed to rule on the issue specifically, it was defendant's
responsibility to pursue the matter. Defendant failed to do this,
instead agreeing to prepare an order reflecting the substitute
agreement of the parties to work together to locate the witness
(Tr. 6-9).
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Defendant did not respond by making a proffer regarding the
contents of Argyle's testimony.

Instead, he responded that,

although the police officers had testified that Argyle was not
working as their agent prior to the time that they placed the taperecorded phone calls from the Provo police station, he believed the
facts might be otherwise (Tr. 93-94).

Defendant also stated that

he wanted to obtain certain court records related to Argyle's
probation termination hearing and other underlying cases as they
might relate to an agency relationship between Argyle and the
police or some possible inducement by the police prior to the time
the phone recordings began (Tr. 94-95).11

In essence, defendant

admitted that he did not know how Argyle would testify, but that
defendant would try to establish that Argyle was a police agent
earlier

than

the

record

evidence

indicated

and

that Argyle

entrapped defendant into manufacturing methamphetamine.

Rather

than making a proffer, then, defendant simply speculated about what
he

thought

the witness might

say.

"A mere

allegation

of

materiality does not justify a finding that a witness is material."
State v. Lairbv, 699 P.2d 1187, 1195 (Utah 1984).
When the witness could not be located, the trial court acted
properly in evaluating the whole record before it, which plainly
demonstrated the limited nature of the relationship between Ross
Argyle and the local law enforcement officers, and in determining
that defendant had failed to carry his burden of demonstrating that
11

The minute entry for the subsequent entrapment hearing
reflects that defendant did not offer any further documentation
related to Argyle (R. 132 or Addendum B ) .
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Argyle was a material witness.12

The trial court so ruled:

There was no evidence presented to the Court
that Argyle was an agent for the DEA or other
law
enforcement
agency
prior
to
his
extradition to Utah. Only by making some kind
of showing that Argyle was an agent while
incarcerated with the defendant could the
defendant raise the materiality of Argyle's
actions during that period.
(R. 148 or Addendum B ) .
Given the overwhelming record evidence against defendant on
the

entrapment

charge,

including

the

testimony

of

three

law

enforcement investigators, tape-recorded telephone conversations,
and a videotape of defendant at work in the methamphetamine lab,
the trial court properly concluded that Ross Argyle was not a
material witness.

Accordingly, the trial court did not commit

error in denying defendant's motion to dismiss for failure of the
State to produce a material witness.

12

Defendant also complains that the trial court did not enter
findings that the State made adequate efforts to locate Argyle.
The court's ruling states:
"The State was not able to locate
Argyle and Mr. Taylor proffered that the State had attempted to
locate Argyle at the address provided by defense counsel, attempted
to locate him in Utah and in Oregon, and that the State had placed
an investigator on the problem without avail" (R. 148 or addendum
a).
Implicit in this ruling is that the State's efforts were
adequate.
Additionally, defendant has failed to include the
transcript of the relevant hearing in the record on appeal.
Because defendant has failed to include all of the evidence
relevant to his claim, it cannot be fully addressed, and the
regularity of the proceedings below must be presumed. Call v. City
of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1053 (Utah App.), cert, denied. 800
P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990).
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POINT FOUR
IN THE ABSENCE OF A COMPLETE
RECORD OF RELEVANT EVIDENCE ON
APPEAL, THIS COURT CANNOT REVIEW
THE TRIAL COURT'S DETERMINATION
THAT DEFENDANT WAS NOT ENTRAPPED
AND MUST, THEREFORE, PRESUME THE
REGULARITY OF THE PROCEEDINGS
BELOW
Defendant asserts that the trial court committed reversible
error by denying his motion to dismiss on the grounds of entrapment
(Br. of App. at 17) .

The record on appeal, however, does not

include the transcript of the entire entrapment hearing upon which
the trial court's ruling was based.

Specifically, defendant has

failed to include in the record on appeal the transcript of the
second

entrapment

hearing, held

on March

8, 1993.

Because

defendant has failed to include the complete record of evidence
dealing with the issue he wishes this Court to review, his claim
must fail.
The first entrapment hearing was held on December 10, 1992.
At the conclusion of that hearing, after the parties had agreed to
work together to locate Ross Argyle, the out-of-state witness, the
trial court stated, "Well, I'll take the matter under advisement as
it relates to the Motion on the Entrapment with the anticipation,
then, that there would either be further documentation that would
be submitted to the Court or further testimony that would be
elicited from Ross Argyle, if he can, in fact, be located" (Tr.
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95) .13
The court then held a second entrapment hearing on March 8,
1993, commemorated in the record on appeal only by a minute entry
(R. 131-32 or Addendum A) .

The minute

entry reflects the

following: the State gave a status report about its attempt to
locate Ross Argyle; the State proffered the testimony of Stan Egan,
a police officer who had testified at the earlier hearing, and of
S.R. Fenter, an individual who is nowhere else referred to in the
record on appeal; Charles Illsley, the D.E.A. chief investigating
officer who testified at the first hearing, testified a second
time, and a copy of transcribed

telephone

conversations was

admitted into evidence; and Cliff Cardall, a witness for the State,
testified and was cross-examined.

Id.

The court then took the

matter under advisement.
Rule 11(e) (2) , Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, requires the
appellant to include in the record a transcript of all evidence
relevant

to

any

finding

or

conclusion

appellant

claims

is

unsupported by or is contrary to the evidence.

"In essence, Rule

11 directs counsel to provide this court with all

evidence

relevant

to the issues raised on appeal." Sampson v. Richins, 770 P.2d 998,
1002 (Utah App.), cert, denied, 776 P.2d 916 (Utah 1989). Where an
appellant fails to provide an adequate record on appeal, the
reviewing court presumes the regularity of the proceedings below.

13

The trial court's ruling of March 15, 1993 also reflects
the court's intent to take the matter under advisement and to
continue the proceedings so that its decision would be based on a
full evidentiary picture. See R. 159 or Addendum A at 3.
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Call v. City of West Jordan, 788 P.2d 1049, 1053 (UtahApp.), cert,
denied, 800 P.2d 1105 (Utah 1990); State v. Linden, 761 P.2d 1386,
1388 (Utah 1988) (jury voir dire recorded but not transcribed).
The burden to ensure that the record contains the materials
necessary to support an appeal rests with the appellant. State v.
Linden, 761 P.2d 1386, 1388 (Utah 1988); State v. Theison, 709 P.2d
307, 309

(Utah 1985) .

This Court will not "speculate on the

existence of facts that do not appear in the record."
that

record[,]

defendant's

assignment

of

error

Id. "Absent
stands

as a

unilateral allegation which the review court has no power to
determine.

This Court simply cannot rule on a question which

depends for its existence upon alleged facts unsupported by the
record."

State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 67 (Utah 1993) (emphasis

omitted) (citations omitted).
Because a transcript of the second entrapment hearing is not
part of the record on appeal, this Court cannot ascertain the
substance of that hearing or review the trial court's final
determination, based on the content of the two hearings, that
defendant was not entrapped.

Consequently, this Court should

presume the regularity of the proceedings below and affirm the
trial court's determination that defendant was not entrapped.
CONCLUSION
For the reasons stated, this Court should affirm defendant's
conviction.
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ORAL ARGUMENT
Because of the complexity of the issues raised and their factspecific nature, the State believes that oral argument would
significantly aid the decisional process in this case.
RESPECTFULLY submitted this ^ _

da

Y

of

March, 1995.

JAN GRAHAM
Attorney General

JOANNE C. SLOTNIK
Assistant Attorney General
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foregoing brief of Appellee were mailed first-class, postage
prepaid, to Michael D. Esplin, Aldrich, Nelson, Weight & Esplin,
Attorney for Defendant, 43 East 200 North, P.O. Box "L", Provo,
Utah

84603-0200, this 2 L

da

Y

of

March, 1995.
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ADDENDA

ADDENDUM A
Minute Entry of March 8, 1993

-

~

F1LEH

IN THE FOURIH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COUgj^ f j ' - ^
UTAH COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH
^^V^
STATE OF UTAH,

CASE NO. 92140045*\(
Plaintiff,

DATE: March 8, 1993

LYNN W. DAVIS, JUDGE

vs.

Rpt. Beverly Lowe, CSR
JAMES BYRNS,
Defendant,

Clerk: Cindy Williamson

HEARING ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR ENTRAPMENT

This matter came before the Court for hearing on defendant's motion for
entrapment. James Taylor, Deputy County Attorney, appeared for and in behalf of the State
of Utah. The defendant was present and represented by Michael D. Esplin.
Mr. Taylor addressed the Court with a status report as to the state's attempted to
locate a Mr. Argyle.
Mr. Taylor further addressed the Court and proffered the testimony of Stan Egan
and an S.R. Fenter.
Charles Illsley was sworn and tetified on direct by Mr. Taylor.
State's exhibit #1, copy of transcript , marked and rec'd.
Mr. Esplin objected to the Court's receiving the exhibit. The Court received the
exhibit over the objection of Mr. Esplin.
Cliff Cardall was sworn and testified on direct by Mr. Taylor. Cross examination
by Mr. Esplin.
Counsel submitted the matter without argument.
The Court reviewed the matters that are currently before it for decision; the motion
to dismiss, defendant's right to a speedy trial, the issue of double jeopardy, concurrent
junsdicational issues, entrapment, and Mr. Esplin's oral motion to dimsis for failure of the

t ot

state to produce Mr. Argyle.
Discussion between Court and counsel.
The trial date of March 9, 1993 was ordered stricken.
The Court took this matter under advisement and set further hearing in this matter
for the 15th day of March, 1993 at 1:15 p.m.

cc: Utah County Atty.
Michael D. Esplin

JLO±

ADDENDUM B
Trial Court Ruling of March 15, 1993

jLJ>J.. ,

Dtputy

IN THE FOURTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR THE COUNTY OF UTAH, STATE OF UTAH
STATE OF UTAH,

RULING

Plaintiff,

Case No. 921400455

v.

Judge Lynn W. Davis

JAMES ARTHUR BYRNS, JR.,
Defendant.

This matter came before the Court on Defendant's Motion to Dismiss and Motion for
Entrapment. A hearing was held on November 16, 1992 concerning the pending motions.
Additional memoranda were filed and on December 10, 1992, the Motion to Dismiss was
submitted for decision. On that same day a hearing was held concerning defendant's Motion
for Entrapment. Testimony was taken and evidence was received. The hearing was
continued until March 8, 1993 to take additional testimony and to entertain closing
arguments. The Court, having heard the evidence and witnesses in support of their
respective positions, having carefully reviewed the file, and being fully advised in the
premises, now enters the following:
RULING
I.
PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Defendant was arrested on August 7,1991 and indicted by a federal grand jury on

August 15, 1991 on one count of Attempt to Manufacture Methamphetamine. This arrest
was the result of a drug task force effort involving the D.E. A. and local law enforcement
officers. No other charges were brought in U.S. District Court, for the District of Utah.
Prior to trial, the federal charges were eventually dismissed based upon a violation the
Federal Speedy Trial Act and an order granting the dismissal was filed on September 2,
1992.
On August 25, 1992, defendant was arrested on the State charges pending in this
case. Counsel was appointed for defendant. The Preliminary Hearing was conducted on
September 8, 1992, and defendant was bound over to this Court. On September 29, 1992,
defendant was arraigned and asserted his right to a speedy trial. The Court accordingly set
trial within thirty days to begin on October 13, 1992.
Defendant filed a number of pro se motions between September 25, 1992 and
December 8, 1992. On October 5, 1992, counsel for defendant filed a Motion for
Entrapment and accompanying memorandum. On October 9, 1992, the Court held a
conference call. The topic of the call was to discuss the original trial date in light of the
defendant's Entrapment motion and to explore possible conflicts of interest. The Court then
struck the October 13, 1992 trial date and set the matter for hearing on October 13, 1992.
On October 13, 1992, the trial date was set for December 10, 1992. Defense counsel was to
file any additional motions by October 19, 1992 and a hearing on all pending motions was
set for October 28, 1992.
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On October 28, 1992, this matter came before the Court on the pending motions.
Defense counsel indicated that he intended to file additional motions and had not yet done so.
This Court then extended the time for defense counsel to file additional motions until October
30, 1992. At the October 28, 1992 hearing, defendant refused to waive any constitutional
rights which might be affected by the Court's action. On November 13, 1992, three days
before the scheduled hearing, defense counsel filed a Motion to Dismiss based on four
issues: (1) double jeopardy; (2) subsequent prosecution for the same criminal episode; (3)
concurrent jurisdiction; and (4) violation of right to a speedy trial. Shortly after this motion
was filed, defendant retained Michael Esplin, Esq. to represent him in this case. Defendant's
new counsel requested more time to prepare for trial and time to supplement the motion to
dismiss and motion for entrapment made by the public defender's office. The Court then
struck the second trial date and set the Entrapment motion for hearing on December 10,
1992.
On December 10, 1992, defendant's entrapment hearing came before this Court. The
State proceeded with its case. The hearing was continued based on a request by defense
counsel that the State produce Ross Argyle, the state's informant, as a witness. The State
agreed to attempt to locate Mr. Argyle and bring him to testify. The Court then continued
the entrapment hearing until March 8, 1993. The trial was set for March 9, 1993. The
Court took the other motions under advisement.
On March 8, 1993, further proceedings were held regarding the entrapment defense.
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The State was not able to produce Mr. Argyle. (See infra p. 14). The State presented
additional evidence and rested. The defendant did not put on any witnesses and the
defendant did not testify. The Court took the entrapment motion under advisement and
struck the March 9, 1993 trial date.

n.
MOTION TO DISMISS
The defendant has raised four issues in his Motion to Dismiss. Additionally, in his
supplemental memorandum, defendant argues that his due process rights have been violated.
This Court will treat each issue separately.

Ax

Ppufrte Jeopardyf

Defendant argues that the state prosecution violates his right not be twice placed in
jeopardy. This constitutional guarantee is found in the fifth amendment to the United States
constitution and Article I, § 12 of the Utah Constitution. Defendant argues that he was first
placed in jeopardy in the federal prosecution. "Jeopardy attaches when an accused in put on
trial in a court of competent jurisdiction, upon a valid indictment (or information), and a jury
has been sworn and impaneled." State v.Pearson. 818 P.2d 581 (Utah App. 1991); Crist v.
Bretz. 437 U.S. 28 (1978). As the State points out in its opposition memorandum, the
defendant was not placed in jeopardy during his federal prosecution because the case was
dismissed prior to trial. The dismissal in the federal court "with prejudice" is not
synonymous with the attachment of double jeopardy. Accordingly, the Court denies
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defendant's claim of a violation of his double jeopardy right.
]L

Section 76-1-403 and Single Criminal Episode.

Defendant argues that the present prosecution is barred by the Utah Single Criminal
Episode statute. U.C.A. §76-1-403 states in pertinent part:
If a defendant has been prosecuted for one or more offenses arising out of a
single criminal episode, a subsequent prosecution for the same or a different
offense for the same or a different offense arising out of the same criminal
episode is barred if:
(a)
The subsequent prosecution is for an offense that was or should
have been tried under Subsection 76-1-402 (2) in the former prosecution; and
(b)
The former prosecution;
(iv)
was terminated by final order or judgment for the
defendant that has not been reversed, set aside, or vacated and
that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact
that must be established to secure conviction in the subsequent
prosecution.
Section 76-1-402 (2) provides:
Whenever conduct may establish separate offenses under a single criminal
episode, unless the court otherwise orders to promote justice, a defendant shall
not be subject to separate trials for multiple offenses when:
(a)
The offenses are within the jurisdiction of a single trial court: and
(b)
The offenses are known to the prosecuting attorney at the time the
defendant is arraigned on the first information or indictment.
(emphasis added).
The defendant presupposes that a federal prosecution for offenses arising out of the
same criminal episode will trigger the protection of the above sections. But as the State has
noted, the above quoted statute requires that the prior and subsequent prosecution be within
the jurisdiction of a single trial court. The Court adopts the reasoning of the State's
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memorandum and accordingly denies defendant's Motion to Dismiss based on section 76-1403.
£L

Prosecution in a Concurrent Jurisdiction.

Defendant argues that the present prosecution is barred by Utah Code Ann. section
76-1-404, which states:
If a defendant's conduct establishes the commission of one or more offenses
within the concurrent jurisdiction of this state and of another jurisdiction,
federal or state, the prosecution in the other jurisdiction is a bar to a
subsequent prosecution in this state if (1) the former prosecution resulted in an
acquittal, conviction, or termination of prosecution, as those terms are defined
in Section 76-1-403 and (2) the subsequent prosecution is for the same offense
or offenses
Defendant argues that the federal dismissal "with prejudice" meets one of the four
requirements as stated in section 76-1-403 (acquittal, conviction, improperly terminated, or
terminated by a final order that necessarily required a determination inconsistent with a fact
that must be proved in a subsequent prosecution). None of these requirements applies to the
current case. This Court denies defendant's motion based on U.C.A. section 76-1-404.
H.

Due Process and the Right to a Speedy Trial.

The defendant alleges a violation of his right to a speedy trial. Related to that
argument, he further alleges a violation of federal due process. This argument appears to be
a variation of defendant's double jeopardy argument. Defendant relies on State v. Shabata.
678 P.2d 785 (Utah 1984) and United States v. Belcher. 762 F.Supp. 666 (W.D. Va. 1991).
In Shabata. state prosecutors were charged with the knowledge of investigators based on the
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rationale that prosecutors and law enforcement officers make up the prosecutorial team. In
Belcher, the former prosecution was brought in state court and subsequently in federal court
by a single prosecutor who had authority to prosecute in both jurisdictions.
The defendant reasons that since federal and state officers were involved in the
underlying investigation which was common to both the federal and state prosecutions, that
the subsequent state prosecution should therefore be bound by result in the federal
prosecution. At very least, defendant urges that the time he spent should be considered for
purposes of speedy trial purposes.
The Utah Supreme Court has addressed the issue of subsequent prosecution by
different jurisdictions. State v. Franklin. 735 P.2d 34 (Utah 1987). In Franklin, the state
prosecution took place after the federal prosecution had concluded. In discussing the
rationale for allowing subsequent state prosecution the Utah Supreme Court stated:
We do not agree with the above-described approach because it relinquishes
unnecessarily the power of the state to try and punish those who break its
laws. Under the rule urged by defendant, the State of Utah would be
foreclosed from legitimate prosecutions by the errors, omissions, or
inadequacies of federal prosecutions and would be unable to try even a
defendant who had received a federal pardon or whose conviction was reversed
by a federal appellate court because of an error in the federal trial. See, e.g.,
State v. LeCoure. 158 Mont. 340, 491 P.2d 1228 (1971) (defendant acquitted
of federal charges based on assault of F.B.I, agent because federal prosecutor
did not prove agent was acting within his official capacity at time of assault
and double jeopardy barred state law assault charges). We note also that the
approach urged by defendant, under which the federal prosecution would be
treated as if it were a Utah proceeding, would allow the federal government to
destroy Utah's right to try defendant merely by bringing defendant to trial for
some minor lesser included offense. See Brown v. QhioT 432 U.S. 161 (1977).
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Defendant asks us to contrast the benefits to the state from the
dual-sovereignty doctrine, which he deems slight, with the unfairness to the
individual that may result from two trials. The protection against multiple
trials perceived by defendant is largely illusory. Were we to hold that Utah
could not try individuals because they had been previously tried in a federal
court, we still could not prevent the federal government from trying
individuals after they had been tried by Utah; we would thus be surrendering
state sovereignty in exchange for a more theoretical than real gain in individual
rights.
Franklin, at 38. Additionally, the Utah Supreme Court has also held that the time a
defendant spends in federal custody cannot be counted against the state for speedy trial
purposes. State v. Trafhy. 799 P.2d 704 (Utah 1990).
Accordingly, this Court rejects defendants reasoning and determines that defendant's
due process rights are not violated by the subsequent state prosecution. Specifically, this
Court will not hold the state prosecution responsible for procedural errors in federal court.
The Court also finds that defendant's right to a speedy trial has not been violated. Defendant
waived his right to a speedy trial at the December 10, 1992 hearing. The delays prior to the
December 10, 1992 trial date occurred as a result of defendants pro se motions and defense
counsel's motions discussed above. The state has been ready to proceed at every stage of
this case and has not caused the delays. This Court denies defendant's Motion to Dismiss
based on an alleged violation of defendant's right to a speedy trial.

n.
ENTRAPMENT DEFENSE
Defendant also argues that the charges should be dismissed due to entrapment by the
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law enforcement officers. Defendant alleges in his Memorandum in Support that Ross
Argyle, acting as a government agent, improperly enticed defendant while both were
incarcerated in Oregon. (See Defendant's Memorandum in Support re: Entrapment, p.2)
Section 76-2-303 states the standard governing entrapment determinations.
76-2-303. Entrapment.
(1) It is a defense that the actor was entrapped into committing the offense.
Entrapment occurs when a law enforcement officer or a person directed by or
acting in cooperation with the officer induces the commission of an offense in
order to obtain evidence of the commission for prosecution by methods
creating a substantial risk that the offense would be committed by one not
otherwise ready to commit it. Conduct merely affording a person an
opportunity to commit an offense does not constitute entrapment.
Once an entrapment defense has been asserted, it is the burden of the prosecution to
prove beyond a reasonable doubt that defendant was not entrapped. State v. Wilson. 565
P.2d 66 (Utah 1977). The entrapment defense can be seen as an attack on the state's burden
to prove that defendant acted voluntarily. State v. Curtis, 542 P.2d 744 (Utah 1975).
The statute cited above incorporates an objective standard. "[T]he focus is not on the
propensities and predisposition of the specific defendant, but on whether the police conduct
revealed in the particular case falls below standards, to which common feelings respond, for
the proper use of government power; the subjective test is specifically rejected." State v.
Taylor, 599 P.2d 496 (Utah 1979)- The standard for finding that entrapment has occurred is
a factual finding that the conduct of the law enforcement officers or their undercover partners
creates a substantial risk that the offense could be committed by one not otherwise ready to
9

commit it. The statute prohibits active inducement, luring an average person into the
commission of an offense.
Recently, the Utah Court of Appeals discussed a trial court's denial of an entrapment
motion. State v. Gallegos. 207 Utah Adv. 53 (Utah App. 1993). In Gallegos. the police
employed a convicted felon as a confidential informant. In upholding the trial court's
decision the court of appeals stated: "At no time in any of the transactions did Bennett
employ inducements that would have been, as a matter of law, sufficient to induce an
ordinary person to commit the crimes for which defendant was convicted/ Id. at 55.
Therefore, agents of law enforcement officers are treated under the objective standard as
well.
The Court has reviewed the transcripts of telephone calls placed to the defendant
between the dates of August 2, and August 7, 1991. Both parties have stipulated as to the
accuracy of the transcript and the Court admitted the transcript. Additionally, the Court
heard testimony from many of the officers involved in the investigation. After carefully
reviewing all the evidence presented, this Court determines that the State has proven beyond
a reasonable doubt that the law enforcement conduct did not create a substantial risk that the
offense would be committed by one not otherwise ready to commit it.

Also, in the present

case there is nothing in the recorded transcripts on conversations between the defendant and
Argyle that demonstrates an "inducement" offered by Argyle to defendant.
The facts supporting this determination are numerous. The transcript of the telephone
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conversations between August 2, and August 7 are replete with statements by defendant
demonstrating his willingness and eagerness to set up a methamphetamine lab. For example,
conversation between the defendant and Ross Argyle made on August 2, 1991 at 10:20 a.m.
demonstrate this point. The defendant also fully understood the risk he was taking.1 Rather

1

On August 3, 1991, telephone call beginning at 8:55 p.m., page four, the defendant
and Charles Illsley had the following conversation:
Jim:

Charles:
Jim:
Charles:
Jim:

Yeah right. It, we, we, we can, we can make ten million dollars, you
know, a million, ten million. We can make fifty million, if everybody
has the balls to do it, but the
If I didn't have, if I didnft have the balls, I wouldn't have been running
around.
The larger you do it though, the more chance you take, you see what
I'm saying?
Yeah.
I'm only talking about a one shot deal and then laying low.

Later in the same conversation, page 6, the defendant demonstrates the risks to himself if
arrested:
Jim:
Charles:
Jim:
Charles:
Jim:
Charles:
Jim:
Charles:
Jim:

I'm not trying to come off as a hard guy.
I mean, no, I hear you, you got to be careful.
I'm just trying to tell you what we can do and what we can't do.
You know, if you're not careful, you end up doing time, and I ain't
doing time.
Yeah, that's the whole thing.
Behind this.
Yeah, and ain't none of us going to do time because I'm, I'm, I'll go
down the hard way, you know, this time cause
Yeah.
You know, you know what, this time, this is my third time, I'll, I'll do
to much time, you know, a lot of time.
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than arm twist the defendant into coming to Utah, the officers involved merely provided the
defendant with an opportunity to set up the lab. The statements in the transcript and the
testimony of the officers are consistent. The defendant planned on coming to Utah, setting
up a Meth lab, selling the product, and dividing the proceeds between himself, Ross Argyle,
and an undercover DEA agent, Charles Illsley. The defendant specifically requested money
from agent Illsley and the Court specifically finds that the defendant's request for "tuition"
did not induce defendant to come to Utah and set up the lab. The ten thousand dollars was
the amount agent Illsley agreed to pay defendant for learning how to produce
methamphetamine.
The Court therefore determines that the State has met its burden of proving voluntary
action on the part of the defendant and the defendant's Motion for Entrapment is hereby
denied.

m.
ESSENTIAL WITNESS
Defendant made an oral motion at the March 8, 1993 hearing that defendant has been
denied due process because of the failure of the State to produce an essential witness. The
Utah Constitution, Article I, Section 12, and the sixth amendment of the United States
Constitution provide, among the rights afforded an accused, the right to compulsory process
for defense witnesses. The issue before this Court is, whether the unavailability of a
proposed defense witness violates due process of law.
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The Utah Supreme Court has stated: "The purpose of due process is to prevent
fundamental unfairness, and one of its essential elements is the opportunity to defend." State
Y. Masstas, 815 P.2d 1319 (Utah 1991). Although this Court has been unable to locate any
authority directly addressing the occasion where a proposed witness is unavailable, this Court
believes that cases interpreting U.C.A. Section 77-21-3 are analogous. Section 77-21-3
provides for issuance of a certificate of attendance in criminal cases for material witnesses.
In State v. Sehrender, 712 P.2d 264 (Utah 1985), the defendant challenged the trial court's
denial of issuing a certificate for attendance of a witness. The supreme court held that
"[fjailure to demonstrate materiality as required by statute is a basis for affirming the trial
court's ruling." The supreme court went on to state:
The sixth amendment to the federal constitution guarantees that '[i]n all
criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the right... to have compulsory
process for obtaining witnesses in his favor....' In Washington v, Texas, 388
U.S. 14 (1967), the United States Supreme Court found a violation of this
guarantee where the defendant had been arbitrarily deprived of 'testimony
[that] would have been relevant and material, and... vital to the defense.' Idat 16 (emphasis added). In United States v. Valenzuela-Bemal. 458 U.S. 858
(1982), the Supreme Court reasoned that the language of the sixth amendment
and of Washington suggested that a criminal defendant, in order to establish a
violation of his constitutional right to compulsory process, must make some
plausible showing that the testimony of the absent witness 'would have been
both material and favorable to his defense.' Id. at 873 (footnote omitted).
Testimony is material, and its exclusion is therefore prejudicial, if there is a
reasonable probability that its presence would affect the outcome of the trial.
'A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient to undermine confidence in
the outcome.* Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, , 104 S. Ct. 2052,
2068 (1984).
'The proper standard of materiality must reflect our overriding concern
with the justice of the finding of guilt.... This means that the omission must be
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evaluated in the context of the entire record. If there is no reasonable doubt
about guilt whether or not the evidence is considered, there is no justification
for a new trial. On the other hand, if the verdict is already of questionable
validity, additional evidence of relatively minor importance might be sufficient
to create a reasonable doubt.9
Id. This Court will apply the above principles to the present case.
There is no dispute as to the State's willingness to produce Mr. Argyle. The
defendant requested that the State produce Argyle as a witness at the hearing and trial. The
State was not able to locate Argyle and Mr. Taylor proffered that the State had attempted to
locate Argyle at the address provided by defense counsel, attempted to locate him in Utah
and in Oregon, and that the State had placed an investigator on the problem without avail.
The Court determines that based on the above, Argyle is not an material witness and
therefore not essential in order to provide the defendant with due process of law. In support
of this determination the Court finds the following facts based on testimony presented at the
hearing: (1) Ross Argyle acted as a confidential informant during the investigation; (2) that
Argyle became an informant after his extradition to Utah on probation violation charges; (3)
that Argyle was provided renumeration for information; (4) all conversations between Argyle
and defendant made while Argyle was in Provo were tape recorded. There was no evidence
presented to the Court that Argyle was an agent for the DEA or other law enforcement
agency prior to his extradition to Utah. Only by making some kind of showing that Argyle
was an agent while incarcerated with the defendant could the defendant raise the materiality
of Argylefs actions during that period.
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The Court hereby denies defendant's motion for dismissal based on violation of due
process of law.
Dated this ^ f d a y of March, 1993.

cc:

Jim Taylor
Michael Esplin
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